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When people ask us, “Aren’t all endpoint solutions the same these days?” — our answer is simple: No. They’re not.

The last round of fixes before Win 10’s final shout touches 15 product families, including Xbox

Dedicated to building a stronger, more inclusive Apple security community through open-source security tools Sophos is proud to be a gold friend of the Objective-See Foundation, supporting its mission to expand access to cybersecurity education and foster innovative community-driven macOS security research. As macOS becomes a bigger target for cybercriminals, organizations like Objective-See are critical […]

Investigate incidents in real time, quickly neutralize active threats, and prevent repeat attacks.

It isn’t just another AI tool — it’s expertise from the team behind the world’s leading MDR service.

441 IT and cybersecurity share their ransomware experiences, revealing the realities facing lower and higher education providers today.

Details from leaked documents:

While people often look at China’s Great Firewall as a single, all-powerful government system unique to China, the actual process of developing and maintaining it works the same way as surveillance technology in the West. Geedge collaborates with academic institutions on research and development, adapts its business strategy to fit different clients’ needs, and even repurposes leftover infrastructure from its competitors.

[…]

The parallels with the West are hard to miss. A number of American surveillance and propaganda firms also started as academic projects before they were spun out into startups and grew by chasing government contracts. The difference is that in China, these companies operate with far less transparency. Their work comes to light only when a trove of documents slips onto the internet.

[…]

It is tempting to think of the Great Firewall or Chinese propaganda as the outcome of a top-down master plan that only the Chinese Communist Party could pull off. But these leaks suggest a more complicated reality. Censorship and propaganda efforts must be marketed, financed, and maintained. They are shaped by the logic of corporate quarterly financial targets and competitive bids as much as by ideology­—except the customers are governments, and the products can control or shape entire societies.

More information about one of the two leaks.

Apple has introduced a new hardware/software security feature in the iPhone 17: “Memory Integrity Enforcement,” targeting the memory safety vulnerabilities that spyware products like Pegasus tend to use to get unauthorized system access. From Wired:

In recent years, a movement has been steadily growing across the global tech industry to address a ubiquitous and insidious type of bugs known as memory-safety vulnerabilities. A computer’s memory is a shared resource among all programs, and memory safety issues crop up when software can pull data that should be off limits from a computer’s memory or manipulate data in memory that shouldn’t be accessible to the program. When developers—­even experienced and security-conscious developers—­write software in ubiquitous, historic programming languages, like C and C++, it’s easy to make mistakes that lead to memory safety vulnerabilities. That’s why proactive tools like special programming languages have been proliferating with the goal of making it structurally impossible for software to contain these vulnerabilities, rather than attempting to avoid introducing them or catch all of them.

[…]

With memory-unsafe programming languages underlying so much of the world’s collective code base, Apple’s Security Engineering and Architecture team felt that putting memory safety mechanisms at the heart of Apple’s chips could be a deus ex machina for a seemingly intractable problem. The group built on a specification known as Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) released in 2019 by the chipmaker Arm. The idea was to essentially password protect every memory allocation in hardware so that future requests to access that region of memory are only granted by the system if the request includes the right secret.

Arm developed MTE as a tool to help developers find and fix memory corruption bugs. If the system receives a memory access request without passing the secret check, the app will crash and the system will log the sequence of events for developers to review. Apple’s engineers wondered whether MTE could run all the time rather than just being used as a debugging tool, and the group worked with Arm to release a version of the specification for this purpose in 2022 called Enhanced Memory Tagging Extension.

To make all of this a constant, real-time defense against exploitation of memory safety vulnerabilities, Apple spent years architecting the protection deeply within its chips so the feature could be on all the time for users without sacrificing overall processor and memory performance. In other words, you can see how generating and attaching secrets to every memory allocation and then demanding that programs manage and produce these secrets for every memory request could dent performance. But Apple says that it has been able to thread the needle.

This is a nice piece of research: “Mind the Gap: Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities in LLM-Enabled Agents“.:

Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM)-enabled agents are rapidly emerging across a wide range of applications, but their deployment introduces vulnerabilities with security implications. While prior work has examined prompt-based attacks (e.g., prompt injection) and data-oriented threats (e.g., data exfiltration), time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) remain largely unexplored in this context. TOCTOU arises when an agent validates external state (e.g., a file or API response) that is later modified before use, enabling practical attacks such as malicious configuration swaps or payload injection. In this work, we present the first study of TOCTOU vulnerabilities in LLM-enabled agents. We introduce TOCTOU-Bench, a benchmark with 66 realistic user tasks designed to evaluate this class of vulnerabilities. As countermeasures, we adapt detection and mitigation techniques from systems security to this setting and propose prompt rewriting, state integrity monitoring, and tool-fusing. Our study highlights challenges unique to agentic workflows, where we achieve up to 25% detection accuracy using automated detection methods, a 3% decrease in vulnerable plan generation, and a 95% reduction in the attack window. When combining all three approaches, we reduce the TOCTOU vulnerabilities from an executed trajectory from 12% to 8%. Our findings open a new research direction at the intersection of AI safety and systems security.