Is There Really Such a Thing as a Low-Paid Ransomware Operator?

Introduction

Going by recent headlines you could be forgiven for thinking all ransomware operators are raking in millions of ill-gotten dollars each year from their nefarious activities.

Lurking in the shadows of every large-scale attack by organized gangs of cybercriminals, however, there can be found a multitude of smaller actors who do not have access to the latest ransomware samples, the ability to be affiliates in the post-DarkSide RaaS world or the financial clout to tool up at speed.

So what is a low-paid ransomware operator to do in such circumstances?

By getting creative and looking out for the latest malware and builder leaks they can be just as devastating to their victims and, in this blog, we will track the criminal career of one such actor as they evolve from homemade ransomware to utilizing major ransomware through the use of publicly leaked builders.

The Rich Get Richer

For years, the McAfee Enterprise Advanced Threat Research (ATR) team has observed the proliferation of ransomware and the birth and (apparent) death of large organized gangs of operators. The most notorious of these gangs have extorted huge sums of money from their victims, by charging for decryption of data or by holding the data itself to ransom against the threat of publication on their ‘leak’ websites.

With the income of such tactics sometimes running into the millions of dollars, such as with the Netwalker ransomware that generated 25 million USD between 1 March and 27 July 2020, we speculate that much of those ill-gotten funds are subsequently used to build and maintain arsenals of offensive cyber tools, allowing the most successful cybercriminals to stay one step ahead of the chasing pack

Figure 1: Babuk group looking for a corporate VPN 0-Day

As seen in the image above, cybercriminals with access to underground forums and deep pockets have the means to pay top dollar for the tools they need to continually generate more income, with this particular Babuk operator offering up 50,000 USD for a 0-day targeting a corporate virtual private network (VPN) which would allow easy access to a new victim.

The Lowly-Paid Don’t Necessarily Stay That Way

For smaller ransomware operators, who do not have affiliation with a large group, the technical skills to create their own devastating malware or the financial muscle to buy what they need, the landscape looks rather different.

Unable to build equally effective attack chains, from initial access through to data exfiltration, their opportunities to make illegal profits are far slimmer in comparison to the behemoths of the ransomware market.

Away from the gaze of researchers who typically focus on the larger ransomware groups, many individuals and smaller groups are toiling in the background, attempting to evolve their own operations any way they can. One such method we have observed is through the use of leaks, such as the recent online posting of Babuk’s builder and source code.

Figure 2: Babuk builder public leak on Twitter

Figure 3: Babuk source code leak on underground forum

McAfee Enterprise ATR has seen two distinct types of cybercriminal taking advantage of leaks such as this. The first group, which we presume to be less tech-savvy, has merely copied and pasted the builder, substituting the Bitcoin address in the ransom note with their own. The second group has gone further, using the source material to iterate their own versions of Babuk, complete with additional features and new packers.

Thus, even those operators at the bottom of the ransomware food chain have the opportunity to build on others’ work, to stake their claim on a proportion of the money to be made from data exfiltration and extortion.

ATR’s Theory of Evolution

A Yara rule dedicated to Babuk ransomware triggered a new sample uploaded on VirusTotal, which brings us to our ‘lowly-paid’ ransomware actor.

From a quick glance at the sample we can deduce that it is a copied and pasted binary output from Babuk’s builder, with an edited ransom note naming the version “Delta Plus”, two recovery email addresses and a new Bitcoin address for payments:

Figure 4: Strings content of “Delta Plus” named version of Babuk

We’ve seen the two email recovery addresses before – they have been used to deliver random ransomware in the past and, by using them to pivot, we were able to delve into the actor’s resume:

The first email address, retrievedata300@gmail.com, has been used to drop a .NET ransomware mentioning “Delta Plus”:

Figure 5: Strings content of .NET ransomware related to previous Delta ransomware activities

Filename Setup.exe
Compiled Time Tue Sep  7 17:58:34 2021
FileType Win32 EXE
FileSize 22.50 KB
Sha256 94fe0825f26234511b19d6f68999d8598a9c21d3e14953731ea0b5ae4ab93c4d

The ransomware is pretty simple to analyze; all mechanisms are declared, and command lines, registry modification, etc., are hardcoded in the binary.

Figure 6: .NET analysis with command line details

In fact, the actor’s own ransomware is so poorly developed (no packing, no obfuscation, command lines embedded in the binary and the fact that the .NET language is easy to analyze) that it is hardly surprising they started using the Babuk builder instead.

By way of contrast, their new project is well developed, easy to use and efficient, no to mention painful to analyze (as it is written in the Golang language) and provides executables for Windows, Linux and network attached storage (NAS) systems.

The second email address, deltapaymentbitcoin@gmail.com, has been used to drop an earlier version of the .NET ransomware

Figure 7: Strings content from first version of .NET ransomware

Filename test2.exe
Compiled Time Mon Aug 30 19:49:54 2021
FileType Win32 EXE
FileSize 15.50 KB
Sha256 e1c449aa607f70a9677fe23822204817d0ff41ed3047d951d4f34fc9c502f761

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

By checking the relationships between “Delta ransomware”, the Babuk iteration and the domains contacted during process execution, we can observe some domains related to our sample:

suporte01928492.redirectme.net
suporte20082021.sytes.net
24.152.38.205

Thanks to a misconfiguration, files hosted on those two domains are accessible through Open Directory (OpenDir), which is a list of direct links to files stored on a server:

Figure 8: Open Directories website where samples are hosted

  • bat.rar: A PowerShell script used to perform several operations:
    • Try to disable Windows Defender
    • Bypass User Account Control (UAC)
    • Get system rights via runasti

Figure 9: Privilege escalation to get system rights

  • exe.rar: Delta Plus ransomware
  • reg.rar: Registry values used to disable Windows Defender

Figure 10: Registry value modifications to disable Windows Defender

Other domains where files are hosted contain different tools used during attack operations:

  • We’ve found two methods employed by the operator, which we assume to be used for initial access: First, a fake Flash Player installer and, secondly, a fake Anydesk remote tool installer used to drop the ransomware. Our theory about Flash Player initial access has been confirmed by checking the IP that hosts most of the domains:

Figure 11: Fake Flash website used to download fake Flash installer

When logging in, the website warns you that your Flash Player version is outdated and tries to download the Fake Flash Player installer:

Figure 12: JavaScript variables used to drop fake Flash Installer

A secondary site appears to have also been utilized in propagating the fake Flash Player, though it is currently offline :

Figure 13: JavaScript function to download the fake Flash Installer from another website

  • Portable Executable (PE) files used to launch PowerShell command lines to delete shadow copies, exclude Windows Defender and import registry keys from “Update.reg.rar” to disable Windows defender.
  • A PE file used for several purposes: Exfiltrating files from the victim, keylogging, checking if the system has already been held to ransom, getting system information, obtaining user information and to create and stop processes.

Figure 14: Functions and C2 configuration from ransomware sample

(host used for extraction)

  • In addition to the above, we also found evidence that this actor tried to leverage another ransomware builder leak, Chaos ransomware.

Infrastructure

The majority of domains used by this actor are hosted on the same IP: “24.152.38.205” (AS 270564 / MASTER DA WEB DATACENTER LTDA).

But as we saw by “analyzing” the extraction tool used by the actor, another IP is mentioned: “149.56147.236” (AS 16276 / OVH SAS). On this IP, some ports are open, such as FTP (probably used to store exfiltrated data), SSH, etc.

By looking at this IP with Shodan, we can get a dedicated hash for the SSH service, plus fingerprints to use on this IP, and then find other IPs used by the actor during their operations.

By using this hash, we were able to map the infrastructure by looking for other IPs sharing the same SSH key + fingerprintings.

At least 174 IPs are sharing the same SSH pattern (key, fingerprint, etc.); all findings are available in the IOCs section.

Some IPs are hosting different file types, maybe related to previous campaigns:

Figure 15: Open Directory website probably used by the same actor for previous campaigns

Bitcoin Interests

Most of the ransomware samples used by the actor mention different Bitcoin (BTC) addresses which we assume is an effort to obscure their activity.

By looking for transactions between those BTC addresses with CipherTrace, we can observe that all the addresses we extracted (see the circle highlighted with a yellow “1” below) from the samples we’ve found are related and eventually point to a single Bitcoin wallet, probably under control of the same threat actor.

From the three samples we researched, we were able to extract the following BTC addresses:

  • 3JG36KY6abZTnHBdQCon1hheC3Wa2bdyqs
  • 1Faiem4tYq7JQki1qeL1djjenSx3gCu1vk
  • bc1q2n23xxx2u8hqsnvezl9rewh2t8myz4rqvmdzh2

Figure 16: Follow the money with CipherTrace

Ransomware Isn’t Just About Survival of the Fittest

As we have seen above, our example threat actor has evolved over time, moving from simplistic ransomware and demands in the hundreds of dollars, to toying with at least two builder leaks and ransom amounts in the thousands of dollars range.

While their activity to date suggests a low level of technical skill, the profits of their cybercrime may well prove large enough for them to make another level jump in the future.

Even if they stick with copy-pasting builders and crafting ‘stagers’, they will have the means at their disposal to create an efficient attack chain with which to compromise a company, extort money and improve their income to the point of becoming a bigger fish in a small pond, just like the larger RaaS crews.

In the meantime, such opportunitistic actors will continue to bait their hooks and catch any fish they can as, unlike affiliated ransomware operators, they do not have to follow any rules in return for support (pentest documentation, software, infrastructure, etc.) from the gang’s operators. Thus, they have a free hand to carry out their attacks and, if a victim wants to bite, they don’t care about ethics or who they target.

The good news for everyone else, however, is the fact that global law enforcement isn’t gonna need a bigger boat, as it already casts its nets far and wide.

 

Mitre Att&ck

Technique ID Technique Description Observable
T1189 Drive By Compromise The actor is using a fake Flash website to spread fake a Flash installer.
T1059.001 Command Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell PowerShell is used to launch command lines (delete shadow copies, etc.).
T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript JavaScript is used in the fake Flash website to download the fake Flash installer.
T1112 Modify Registry To disable Windows Defender, the actor modifies registry. “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindows Defender” and “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindows DefenderReal-Time Protection”.
T1083 File and Directory Discovery The actor is listing files on the victim system.
T1057 Process Discovery The actor is listing running processes on the victim system.
T1012 Query Registry To perform some registry modifications, the actor is first querying registry path.
T1082 System Information Discovery Before encrypting files, the actor is listing hard drives.
T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging The exfiltration tool has the capability to log user keystrokes.
T1005 Data from Local System
T1571 Non-Standard Port The actor is using port “1177” to exfiltrate data.
T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Data encrypted by ransomware.
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery Delete Shadow Copies.

 

Detection Mechanisms

Sigma Rules

–          Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_shadow_copies_deletion.yml

–          Drops Script at Startup Location: https://github.com/joesecurity/sigma-rules/blob/master/rules/dropsscriptatstartuplocation.yml

–          File Created with System Process Name: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file_event/sysmon_creation_system_file.yml

–          Suspicious Svchost Process: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_svchost.yml

–          System File Execution Location Anomaly: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_system_exe_anomaly.yml

–          Delete Shadow copy via WMIC: https://github.com/joesecurity/sigma-rules/blob/master/rules/deleteshadowcopyviawmic.yml

–          Always Install Elevated Windows Installer: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/59000b993d6280d9bf063eefdcdf30ea0e83aa5e/rules/windows/process_creation/sysmon_always_install_elevated_windows_installer.yml

 

Yara Rules

Babuk Ransomware Windows

rule Ransom_Babuk {

meta:

description = “Rule to detect Babuk Locker”

author = “TS @ McAfee Enterprise ATR”

date = “2021-01-19”

hash = “e10713a4a5f635767dcd54d609bed977”

rule_version = “v2”

malware_family = “Ransom:Win/Babuk”

malware_type = “Ransom”

mitre_attack = “T1027, T1083, T1057, T1082, T1129, T1490, T1543.003”

 

strings:

$s1 = {005C0048006F007700200054006F00200052006500730074006F0072006500200059006F00750072002000460069006C00650073002E007400780074}

//  How To Restore Your Files .txt

$s2 = “delete shadows /all /quiet” fullword wide

 

$pattern1 = {006D656D74617300006D65706F63730000736F70686F730000766565616D0000006261636B7570000047785673730000004778426C7200
000047784657440000004778435644000000477843494D67720044656657617463680000000063634576744D67720000000063635365744D67720000000
0536176526F616D005254567363616E0051424643536572766963650051424944505365727669636500000000496E747569742E517569636B426F6F6B732E46435300}

$pattern2 = {004163725363683253766300004163726F6E69734167656E74000000004341534144324457656253766300000043414152435570646174655376630000730071}

$pattern3 = {FFB0154000C78584FDFFFFB8154000C78588FDFFFFC0154000C7858CFDFFFFC8154000C78590FDFFFFD0154000C78594FDFFFFD8154
000C78598FDFFFFE0154000C7859CFDFFFFE8154000C785A0FDFFFFF0154000C785A4FDFFFFF8154000C785A8FDFFFF00164000C785ACFDFFFF081640
00C785B0FDFFFF10164000C785B4FDFFFF18164000C785B8FDFFFF20164000C785BCFDFFFF28164000C785C0FDFFFF30164000C785C4FDFFFF3816400
0C785C8FDFFFF40164000C785CCFDFFFF48164000C785D0FDFFFF50164000C785D4FDFFFF581640}

$pattern4 ={400010104000181040002010400028104000301040003810400040104000481040005010400058104000601040006C104000781040008
41040008C10400094104000A0104000B0104000C8104000DC104000E8104000F01040000011400008114000181140002411400038114000501140005C
11400064114000741140008C114000A8114000C0114000E0114000F4114000101240002812400034124000441240005412400064124000741240008C1
24000A0124000B8124000D4124000EC1240000C1340002813400054134000741340008C134000A4134000C4134000E8134000FC134000141440003C14
4000501440006C144000881440009C144000B4144000CC144000E8144000FC144000141540003415400048154000601540007815}

 

condition:

filesize >= 15KB and filesize <= 90KB and

1 of ($s*) and 3 of ($pattern*)

}

 

Exfiltration Tool

rule CRIME_Exfiltration_Tool_Oct2021 {

meta:

description = “Rule to detect tool used to exfiltrate data from victim systems”

author = “TS @ McAfee Enterprise ATR”

date = “2021-10-04”

hash = “ceb0e01d96f87af0e9b61955792139f8672cf788d506c71da968ca172ebddccd”

 

strings:

$pattern1 = {79FA442F5FB140695D7ED6FC6A61F3D52F37F24B2F454960F5D4810C05D7A83D4DD8E6118ABDE2055E4D
CCFE28EBA2A11E981DB403C5A47EFB6E367C7EC48C5EC2999976B5BC80F25BEF5D2703A1E4C2E3B30CD26E92570DAF1F9BD7B48B38FB522358}

$pattern2 = {B4A6D4DD1BBEA16473940FC2DA103CD64579DD1A7EBDF30638A59E547B136E5AD113835B8294F53B8C3A
435EB2A7F649A383AA0792DD14B9C26C1BCA348920DFD37DA3EF6260C57C546CA51925F684E91239152DC05D5161A9064434}

$pattern3 = {262E476A45A14D4AFA448AF81894459F7296633644F5FD061A647C6EF1BA950FF1ED48436D1BD4976BF8
1EE84AE09D638BD2C2A01FA9E22D2015518280F6692EB976876C4045FADB71742B9579C13C7482A44A}

$pattern4 = {F2A113713CCB049AFE352DB8F99160855125E5A045C9F6AC0DCA0AB615BD34367F2CA5156DCE5CA286CC
C55E37DFCDC5AAD14ED9DAB3CDB9D15BA91DD79FF96E94588F30}

 

condition:

3 of ($pattern*)

}

 

 

IOCs

Infrastructure URLs

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update4/

http://services5500.sytes.net/Update6/Update.exe.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/Update5/

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/update4/update.exe.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/Update3/

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update3/

http://services5500.sytes.net/update8/update.exe.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/update/

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/Update5/Update.exe.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/AppMonitorPlugIn.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/Update5/Update.exe.rar

http://services5500.sytes.net/update7/update.exe.rar

http://services5500.sytes.net/Update8/Update.exe.rar

http://services5500.sytes.net/Update8/Update.bat.rar

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/update/

http://services5500.sytes.net/Update7/Update.exe.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/Update7/Update.bat.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/Update7/Update.exe.rar

http://services5500.sytes.net/update6/update.exe.rar

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/

http://services5500.sytes.net/Update6/Update.bat.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/update6/update.exe.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/update5/update.exe.rar

http://services5500.sytes.net/

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/Update6/Update.exe.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update3

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/update3/update.reg.rar

http://24.152.38.205/pt/flashplayer28_install.zip

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/Update7

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/update3/mylink.vbs.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/update7/update.exe.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update4/Update.exe.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/appmonitorplugin.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/update3/update.exe.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/update3/update.exe.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update4/Update.exe2.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/Update3/Update.exe.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/Update5/Update.reg.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update4/Update.exe2.rar/

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update4

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/update/WindowsUpdate2.rar

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/update

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update3/Update.reg.rar/

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update3/Update.exe.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/Update3/Update.exe.rar/

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/update/WindowsUpdate2.rar/

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update4/Update.exe.rar/

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update3/mylink.vbs.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/update4

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/update3

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/update/Update.rar

http://suporte01928492.redirectme.net/AppMonitorPlugIn.rar/

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/update5/update.exe.rar

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/update5/update.exe.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/update4/update.exe2.rar

http://suporte01092021.myftp.biz/update/windowsupdate2.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/update2/update.exe.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/update/windowsupdate2.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/Update4/mylink.vbs.rar

http://atualziarsys.serveirc.com/favicon.ico

http://24.152.38.205/1.rar

http://24.152.38.205/1.exe

http://appmonitorplugin.sytes.net/appmonitorplugin.rar

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/update/WindowsUpdate2.rar

http://appmonitorplugin.sytes.net/

http://suporte20082021.sytes.net/appmonitorplugin.rar

http://suportmicrowin.sytes.net/appmonitorplugin.rar

http://suportmicrowin.sytes.net/

http://suportmicrowin.sytes.net/AppMonitorPlugIn.rar

http://appmonitorplugin.sytes.net/AppMonitorPlugIn.rar

http://24.152.38.205/pt/setup.zip

 

Infrastructure Domains

services5500.sytes.net

atualziarsys.serveirc.com

suporte01092021.myftp.biz

suporte20082021.sytes.net

suporte01928492.redirectme.net

suportmicrowin.sytes.net

appmonitorplugin.sytes.net

 

Infrastructure IPs

149.56.147.236

24.152.38.205

54.38.122.66

149.56.38.168

149.56.38.170

24.152.36.48

66.70.170.191

66.70.209.174

142.44.129.70

51.79.107.245

46.105.36.189

178.33.108.239

54.39.193.37

24.152.37.115

144.217.139.134

24.152.36.58

51.38.19.201

51.222.97.177

51.222.53.150

144.217.45.69

87.98.137.173

144.217.199.24

24.152.37.19

144.217.29.23

198.50.246.8

54.39.163.60

54.39.84.55

24.152.36.30

46.105.38.67

24.152.37.96

51.79.63.229

178.33.107.134

164.132.77.246

54.39.163.58

149.56.113.76

51.161.120.193

24.152.36.210

176.31.37.238

176.31.37.237

24.152.36.83

24.152.37.8

51.161.76.193

24.152.36.117

137.74.246.224

51.79.107.134

51.79.44.49

51.222.173.152

51.79.124.129

51.79.107.242

51.222.173.148

144.217.117.172

54.36.82.187

54.39.152.91

54.36.82.177

142.44.146.178

54.39.221.163

51.79.44.57

149.56.38.173

24.152.36.46

51.38.19.198

51.79.44.59

198.50.246.11

24.152.36.35

24.152.36.239

144.217.17.186

66.70.209.169

24.152.36.158

54.39.84.50

51.38.19.200

144.217.45.68

144.217.111.5

54.38.164.134

87.98.171.7

51.79.124.130

66.70.148.142

51.255.119.19

66.70.209.168

54.39.239.81

24.152.36.98

51.38.192.225

144.217.117.10

144.217.189.108

66.70.148.136

51.255.55.134

54.39.137.73

66.70.148.137

54.36.146.230

51.79.107.254

54.39.84.52

144.217.61.176

24.152.36.150

149.56.147.236

51.38.19.196

54.39.163.57

46.105.36.133

149.56.68.191

24.152.36.107

158.69.99.10

51.255.55.136

54.39.247.244

149.56.147.204

158.69.99.15

144.217.32.24

149.56.147.205

144.217.32.213

54.39.84.53

79.137.115.160

144.217.233.98

51.79.44.56

24.152.36.195

142.44.146.190

144.217.139.13

54.36.82.180

198.50.246.14

137.74.246.223

24.152.36.176

51.79.107.250

51.161.76.196

198.50.246.12

66.70.209.170

66.70.148.139

51.222.97.189

54.39.84.49

144.217.17.185

142.44.129.73

144.217.45.67

24.152.36.28

144.217.45.64

24.152.37.39

198.27.105.3

51.38.8.75

198.50.204.38

54.39.221.11

51.161.76.197

54.38.122.64

91.134.217.71

24.152.36.100

144.217.32.26

198.50.246.13

54.36.82.188

54.39.84.25

66.70.209.171

51.38.218.215

54.39.8.92

51.38.19.205

54.39.247.228

24.152.36.103

24.152.36.104

51.79.44.43

54.39.152.202

66.70.134.218

24.152.36.25

149.56.113.79

178.32.243.48

144.217.45.66

66.70.173.72

176.31.37.239

54.38.225.81

158.69.4.173

24.152.37.189

54.36.146.129

198.50.246.15

51.222.102.30

51.79.105.91

51.79.9.91

51.222.173.151

51.79.107.124

51.222.173.142

144.217.17.187

149.56.85.98

51.79.107.244

144.217.158.195

24.152.36.178

192.95.20.74

51.79.117.250

 

Ransomware Hashes

106118444e0a7405c13531f8cd70191f36356581d58789dfc5df3da7ba0f9223

e1c449aa607f70a9677fe23822204817d0ff41ed3047d951d4f34fc9c502f761

ae6020a06d2a95cbe91b439f4433e87d198547dec629ab0900ccfe17e729cff1

c3776649d9c0006caba5e654fa26d3f2c603e14463443ad4a5a08e4cf6a81994

63b6a51be736d253e26011f19bd16006d7093839b345363ef238eafcfe5e7e85

94fe0825f26234511b19d6f68999d8598a9c21d3e14953731ea0b5ae4ab93c4d

c8d97269690d3b043fd6a47725a61c00b57e3ad8511430a0c6254f32d05f76d6

67bc70d4141d3f6aaf8f17963d56df5cee3727a81bc54407e90fdf1a6dc8fe2a

98a3ef26b346c4f47e5dfdba4e3e26d1ef6a4f15969f83272b918f53d456d099

c3c306b2d51e7e4f963a6b1905b564ba0114c8ae7e4bb4656c49d358c0f2b169

 

Bitcoin Addresses

3JG36KY6abZTnHBdQCon1hheC3Wa2bdyqs

1Faiem4tYq7JQki1qeL1djjenSx3gCu1vk

bc1q2n23xxx2u8hqsnvezl9rewh2t8myz4rqvmdzh2

 

PDB

C:UsersworkdreamsDesktopTestesCrypt_FInalCrazy_CryptCrazyobjDebugAppMonitorPlugIn.pdb

C:UsersworkdreamsDesktoptestNopyfy-Ransomware-masterNopyfy-RansomwareNopyfy-RansomwareobjDebugNopyfy-Ransomware.pdb

 

PowerShell Script

a8d7b402e78721443d268b682f8c8313e69be945b12fd71e2f795ac0bcadb353

 

Exfiltration Tool

ceb0e01d96f87af0e9b61955792139f8672cf788d506c71da968ca172ebddccd

c3323fbd0d075bc376869b0ee26be5c5f2cd4e53c5efca8ecb565afa8828fb53

 

Fake Flash Player installer

d6c35e23b90a7720bbe9609fe3c42b67d198bf8426a247cd3bb41d22d2de6a1f

 

Fake Anydesk Installer

e911c5934288567b57a6aa4f9344ed0f618ffa4f7dd3ba1221e0c42f17dd1390

 

 

The post Is There Really Such a Thing as a Low-Paid Ransomware Operator? appeared first on McAfee Blogs.

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iPhone Hackers Win $300K

iPhone Hackers Win $300K

A white hat hacking team has won a life-changing amount of money for completing the world’s first public remote jailbreak of the iPhone 13 Pro.

The feat was performed over the weekend at the fourth annual Tianfu Cup, an international cybersecurity competition held in Chengdu in the People’s Republic of China. The event offers big cash prizes to cybersecurity researchers who can demonstrate their ability to get around the digital defenses of consumer software and devices.

During the Cup, Apple’s newest iPhone, running the latest and fully patched version of iOS 15.0.2, was reportedly hacked not once but twice. 

The first hack was demonstrated live on stage by the Kunlan Lab team. It was achieved in fifteen seconds by exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability.

Another team at the Tianfu Cup that managed to hack into Apple’s latest iPhone was Team Pangu. It was this team that claimed the top prize in the competition for remotely jailbreaking a fully patched iPhone 13 Pro running iOS 15. 

According to Forbes, the details of how Team Pangu achieved the hack have not been publicized. But reports suggest that when a user clicked on a link forged by the team, the Safari web browser was triggered. 

The team was then able to bypass the browser’s protection mechanism and exploit multiple iOS15 kernel vulnerabilities to access the iPhone’s contents. 

The hacking team accessed apps and photo albums and was able to directly delete data on the iPhone and execute other commands.

Three tiers of prizes were up for grabs by teams that hacked the iPhone 13 Pro. A team that broke in using remote code execution could win $120,000, while remote code execution with a sandbox escape could earn the competing team $180,000. For the remote jailbreak, the trickiest feat to pull off, the cash prize was a whopping $300,000.

Other hacking targets featured in the competition included remote code execution attacks against Safari running on both Intel and Apple Silicon MacBook Pro models, the multi-functional Network-Attached Storage server Synology NAS, a Xiaomi Mi 11 smartphone, and Windows 10 and Google Chrome running on notebooks.

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South Korea Wants Help to Arrest Alleged Cyber-Criminals

South Korea Wants Help to Arrest Alleged Cyber-Criminals

South Korea is seeking assistance from the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to arrest two foreign nationals suspected of being cyber-criminal gang leaders.

The two individuals allegedly played a key role in multiple cyber-attacks and a major extortion scam that claimed victims in both South Korea and the United States. 

On Friday, South Korea said that it had asked Interpol to issue a “Red Notice” for the suspects to bring them to the country to face prosecution. 

Red notices, the most consequential type of notice Interpol can issue, “seek the location and arrest of a person wanted by a legal jurisdiction or an international tribunal with a view to his/her extradition.”

The notice isn’t an arrest warrant, but it is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action.

The Korean Police Agency said it has received domestic arrest warrants for the two suspects. However, the names of the two suspects have not been released. But it has been reported that one of the suspects is a Ukrainian national who was detained along with five other people by Ukrainian police in June. 

The detention was part of a joint raid by South Korean and United States authorities on the homes of individuals allegedly linked with the Clop ransomware gang. 

It is alleged by the South Korean police that the detained suspects laundered virtual currency for a hacking organization. The crypto-currency was allegedly the proceeds of ransomware attacks and was later converted into cash. 

South Korean police charged three of the detainees earlier this month with violating South Korea’s laws on communication networks and information protection, extortion and concealing criminal proceeds. 

Choi Jongsang, chief of the South Korean police’s cybercrime investigation division, said that the two red notice suspects played leading roles in cyber-attacks carried out in 2019. The attacks deployed ransomware against a university and three companies in South Korea. 

The victims capitulated to the attackers’ demands, handing over a Bitcoin ransom worth $3.8m. Police in the Ukraine reportedly said that the same gang attacked Stanford Medical School, the University of Maryland, and other educational establishments in the United States.

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Cyber-Attack on US TV Broadcaster

Cyber-Attack on US TV Broadcaster

American media company Sinclair Broadcast Group is in the grips of a ransomware attack.

The Baltimore-based company, which operates and/or provides services to 185 television stations in 86 markets, became aware of a potential security incident on Saturday and launched an investigation. 

In a statement released Monday, the group said: “On October 17, 2021, the Company [Sinclair Broadcast Group] identified that certain servers and workstations in its environment were encrypted with ransomware, and that certain office and operational networks were disrupted.”

Sinclair Broadcast Group said that the unknown attacker(s) took data from its company network. It is not yet known whether any sensitive information was among the data stolen during the attack.

“The Company is working to determine what information the data contained and will take other actions as appropriate based on its review,” said Sinclair Broadcast Group.

In response to the event, the group implemented its incident response plan and took measures to contain the incident.

“Legal counsel, a cybersecurity forensic firm, and other incident response professionals were engaged. The Company also notified law enforcement and other governmental agencies,” said Sinclair Broadcast Group. 

As the forensic investigation into the attack continues, operations at the company remain strange.

The group warned that “the event has caused – and may continue to cause – disruption to parts of the Company’s business, including certain aspects of its provision of local advertisements by its local broadcast stations on behalf of its customers.”

The company added that it is “working diligently to restore operations quickly and securely” and that it will “look for opportunities to enhance its existing security measures.”

The impact of the attack is reportedly being felt far away from the company’s headquarters in Maryland. Kristin Bien, a weekend anchor at Sinclair-owned WSBT 22 in Indiana, tweeted on Sunday: “We don’t have access to our company emails or anything that requires a company login.”

Meanwhile, Nashville, Tennessee’s WZTV uploaded a statement to its website on Monday about “serious technical issues” impacting its ability to stream content.

“We are also currently unable to access our email and your phone calls to the station,” the statement read.

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Fraud Victims Lose £9.3bn in Well-Being per Year

Fraud Victims Lose £9.3bn in Well-Being per Year

Fraud victims suffer well-being costs of £9.3bn per year, according to a new study by Which?

The consumer group made the calculation after conducting an analysis of the psychological harms experienced by people who lose money to scammers. The research conducted with consultancy firm Simetrica found that scam victims have a lower life satisfaction on average than the general population. This includes higher levels of anxiety, lower levels of happiness and to a lesser extent, worse general health.

To make their findings, the researchers analyzed over 17,000 responses to a survey by the Office for National Statistics’ Crime Survey for England and Wales, which asked respondents about the impact on well-being of being scammed.

They applied these results to a social impacts model approved by the UK government earlier this year. This model translates well-being changes into monetary terms.

Which? then calculated that the average drop in well-being for fraud victims equates to £2509 per year. The value is even higher for online fraud, at £3684. These figures are significantly higher than the average financial fraud losses, estimated by Which? to be around £600 per incident.

By applying these calculations to the 3.7 million fraud incidents in 2019/20, the researchers concluded that the overall well-being loss associated with fraud is £9.3bn.

Interestingly, online fraud alone was associated with well-being losses of £7.2bn, highlighting how scammers have increasingly targeted digital consumers in recent years, particularly amid the digital shift since COVID-19.

In July, an analysis by money.co.uk found that Brits lost more than £1bn to fraud and cybercrime in the first six months of 2021.

Which? is now calling on the UK government to include scam adverts in its Online Safety Bill, announced earlier this year.

Rocio Concha, director of policy and advocacy at Which?, outlined: “Our research shows that scam victims suffer a significant drop in well-being when they are targeted by criminals. This brings home the scale of the emotional and psychological harm that victims suffer when they are defrauded.

“The government must not ignore the huge impact an epidemic of fraud is having on our society. Scam adverts must be included in the Online Safety Bill and ministers must set out plans for laws and regulations that will make online platforms use their highly sophisticated technology to effectively tackle harmful content on their sites.”

Commenting on the research, Tim Sadler, co-Founder and CEO for Tessian, said: “Of course, we must recognize the emotional and mental toll online fraud has on people, in addition to the financial damage. Online scams have surged during the pandemic, with cyber-criminals impersonating trusted organizations and institutions over email or text to successfully con people into sharing sensitive data, payment information or login credentials. And this has left people feeling anxious, scared and helpless.”

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Europol Warns of Major EU Recovery Fund Fraud

Europol Warns of Major EU Recovery Fund Fraud

European police have announced a major operation designed to tackle a wave of anticipated fraud linked to the disbursement of the EU’s COVID-19 recovery fund.

The €807bn ($935bn) in NextGenerationEU loans and grants will be split between 19 member states and is designed to support investment in more sustainable and resilient societies – to correct some of the economic and social damage wrought by the pandemic.

However, the fund will also be a magnet for fraudsters, which is why Europol has announced Operation Sentinel. The initiative will also receive support from four EU entities and authorities from all participating member states.

“Recent experience from the evolution of the criminal landscape during the COVID-19 pandemic suggests these efforts will attract criminal groups active in the EU and beyond. Criminals have shown themselves to be quick in adapting to the pandemic and its impact, and they are using every opportunity to maximize illegal profits,” said Europol.

“For this purpose, Europol will establish a dedicated internal mechanism to process operational data, steer information exchanges and support ongoing cases. The joint activities will target fraud, as well as tax evasion, excise fraud, corruption, embezzlement, misappropriation and money laundering.”

The experience of the US could be instructive in this regard. The country experienced widespread fraud targeting individuals who received COVID-19 stimulus checks and exploiting the fact that businesses were eligible for various hand-outs and loans.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) claimed it received double the number of identity theft reports than usual during 2020.

It also estimated back in March that pandemic-related fraud may have cost Americans around $382m, although the true figure is likely to be much higher as it only relates to consumer fraud reported to the agency.

Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans were another central area of fraud as business owners, and criminal gangs tried to take advantage of government largesse.

One report estimated that as many as 15% of PP loans may have been fraudulent, at a potential cost to the taxpayer of $76bn.

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Twitch: No Passwords Were Taken in Data Breach

Twitch: No Passwords Were Taken in Data Breach

A massive breach at one of the world’s biggest gaming platforms earlier this month may not be as bad as first thought, with the firm claiming that no passwords were exposed in the incident.

Security experts roundly criticized Amazon-owned Twitch after an anonymous user posted a 125GB torrent link to 4Chan, and claimed to have leaked every digital property owned by the firm.

However, in an update on Friday, Twitch claimed that user passwords were not impacted.

“We are also confident that systems that store Twitch login credentials, which are hashed with bcrypt, were not accessed, nor were full credit card numbers or ACH / bank information,” it added.

“The exposed data primarily contained documents from Twitch’s source code repository, as well as a subset of creator pay-out data. We’ve undergone a thorough review of the information included in the files exposed and are confident that it only affected a small fraction of users and the customer impact is minimal. We are contacting those who have been impacted directly.”

At the time, the attacker claimed to have all of the firm’s source code; mobile, desktop and console clients; proprietary SDKs and internal AWS services; and “every other property” it owns, including IGDB, CurseForge and an unreleased Steam competitor, dubbed “Vapor.”

Also reportedly compromised were red teaming tools used by the Twitch’s SecOps function and information on how much the firm paid its most popular streamers.

That prompted some to argue the incident was “as bad as it gets” from an infosecurity perspective. Others were dumbfounded that an individual could have stolen so much sensitive information without setting off any internal alarms.

Although only a small number of users appear to have been impacted by the incident, the scale of the IP breach would still indicate that Twitch’s security posture was not up to par. 

The unauthorized third party in question was able to access the data after a server misconfiguration, according to Twitch.

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